By Dr. Tsultim Zangmo and Dr. Vikash Ranjan Singh
For more than seven decades, Pakistan has projected Pakistan-Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) as “Azad Jammu and Kashmir” (AJK), depicting it as an independent region whose people freely chose to align with Pakistan. However, the current protests that have swept across the territory in recent months put a different image of Pakistan. Thousands of residents have taken to the streets demanding the basic living necessities; affordable electricity, subsidized wheat flour, employment opportunities, transparent governance, and an end to what they present as Islamabad’s exploitation of their land and resources. These demonstrations are not merely about inflation or rising electricity bills. They represent the years of frustration of generations who believe that despite producing electricity, contributing natural resources, and occupying immense strategic importance, Pakistan-Occupied Jammu and Kashmir has remained politically marginalized, economically neglected, and constitutionally subordinate to Islamabad. The country only took the benefits but didn’t return a penny of their livelihood.
From India’s perspective, the ongoing protests reinforce a long-standing position: Pakistan has failed to provide effective governance in a territory that India considers an integral part of its sovereign territory. As public anger intensifies and Islamabad struggles to contain growing discontent, an important question emerges; has Pakistan begun losing not only its moral legitimacy but also the confidence of the people it claims to represent?
THE HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE DISPUTE
The story of Pakistan-Occupied Jammu and Kashmir begins with the partition of India in 1947. At the time of independence, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was ruled by Maharaja Hari Singh. Like every other princely ruler, he was given the constitutional option of acceding either to India or Pakistan. Initially, the Maharaja sought to remain independent. However, Pakistan was unwilling to wait for his decision. In October 1947, thousands of armed tribal militias, backed by Pakistan, invaded Jammu and Kashmir. Their objective was simple: capture Srinagar before the Maharaja could formally accede to India. The invasion resulted in widespread violence, looting, and atrocities against civilians as the tribal forces advanced rapidly towards the Kashmir Valley. Facing an existential threat, Maharaja Hari Singh appealed to India for military assistance. The Government of India agreed, but only after the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947. Governor-General Lord Mountbatten accepted the accession on the following day, making Jammu and Kashmir legally an integral part of the Indian land under the same constitutional process through which more than 560 princely states joined the Indian Union. Indian troops were immediately airlifted to Srinagar and successfully halted the invasion. However, before the entire territory could be reclaimed, a United Nations mediated ceasefire came into effect in January 1949. The ceasefire left Pakistan in control of approximately one-third of the erstwhile princely state, a region that India officially describes as Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POJK). Since then, every Indian government has maintained that Pakistan’s presence in POJK is the result of military aggression rather than any legitimate constitutional process which happened without the willingness of Kashmir Valley.
PAKISTAN’S CONSTITUTIONAL CONTRADICTION
Pakistan frequently refers to the territory as “Azad Jammu and Kashmir,” implying that it enjoys autonomy. Yet Pakistan’s own constitutional framework presents a striking contradiction. Article 1 of the Constitution of Pakistan defines the territories that constitute Pakistan. Notably, Azad Jammu and Kashmir does not appear among them. This omission reflects Pakistan’s long-standing claim that the territory’s final status remains linked to the unresolved Kashmir dispute. Despite not constitutionally incorporating the region as part of Pakistan, Islamabad exercises overwhelming influence over its governance. On paper, Pakistan Occupied Kashmir possesses all the institutions associated with democratic self-government. It has its own President, Prime Minister, Legislative Assembly, Supreme Court, High Court, Constitution, and elected representatives. To an outside observer, these institutions create the appearance of political autonomy. In reality, however, the authority of these institutions is widely regarded as limited. Critical decisions concerning finance, defence, foreign affairs, major development projects, and administrative appointments remain heavily influenced by Islamabad.
Perhaps the clearest illustration of this limited autonomy lies in the electoral process itself. Under the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, which was enacted by the Government of Pakistan, every individual seeking to contest elections or hold constitutional office must declare allegiance or we can say the candidate signs a loyalty to the ideology of the state’s accession to Pakistan. Candidates advocating independence or proposing any constitutional arrangement other than accession to Pakistan are effectively barred from participating in elections.
RICH IN RESOURCES STILL ECONOMICALLY NEGLECTED
Pakistan often highlights the strategic importance of POJK, yet many residents argue that the region has received little in return. POJK is rich in its resources, including forests, minerals like; graphite, marbal, gemstone, and water. Nearly 70 percent of Pakistan’s irrigation water comes from the Indus Water System that originates in the POJK. Even the hydropower projects in the region generates around 10-15% of the Pakistan’s Electricity. Despite possessing enormous hydroelectric potential and contributing significantly to Pakistan’s electricity generation, residents continue to face high electricity tariffs and receive less economic benefits from their own resources. The total generated revenue goes to the mainland Pakistan while the local infrastructure and public services remain underdeveloped. Projects such as the Mangla Dam have supplied electricity to Pakistan for decades, but many locals contend that they have not benefited proportionately from the wealth generated by their own resources. The region continues to struggle with unemployment, inadequate healthcare facilities, poor educational infrastructure, limited industrial development, and rising inflation. For many residents, the contradiction is glaring. A region rich in natural resources remains economically dependent, while much of the generated wealth flows elsewhere. 66 percent of the population of POJK is fully dependent on farming; still 57.1 percent of the population faces the food insecurity and 29 percent of the total population is undernourished, which is higher than the national average of Pakistan.
It is this perception of economic injustice that has fuelled growing public resentment against Islamabad.
PROTEST: BY WHOM AND WHY?
The growing frustration eventually found organised expression through the Jammu Kashmir Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), which was founded in 2023 and later was banned by the regional government for its engagement in terrorism. Unlike conventional political parties, JAAC emerged as a coalition of traders, lawyers, transport unions, civil society organisations, and ordinary citizens united around socio-economic concerns rather than electoral ambitions. The movement rapidly gained momentum because it focused on issues affecting everyday life rather than ideological debates. JAAC presented a comprehensive charter consisting of 38 demands, many of which concern basic public welfare. Among its principal demands are lower electricity tariffs based on local hydropower generation, subsidized wheat flour, withdrawal of excessive taxes, greater transparency in governance, employment opportunities for youth, improved healthcare, better educational facilities, accountability for corruption, improved infrastructure, and increased local control over the region’s natural resources and abolishment of 12 seats reserved for refugees from Jammu and Kashmir who lives in Pakistan in POJK legislative assembly; they demanded it because these reserved seats allow Islamabad to exert disproportionate political influence over the region because these representatives are elected by refugee voters outside the territory. JAAC wants all the 45 general assembly seats to represent people who actually live in Pakistan administered Kashmir.
These demands reflect not extraordinary political aspirations but the everyday expectations of citizens seeking affordable living conditions and accountable governance. The recent demonstrations have spread across Muzaffarabad, Mirpur, Kotli, Bagh, Rawalakot, and several other towns. Thousands of protesters have organised strikes, blocked highways, and challenged the administration through sustained public mobilisation. Clashes between demonstrators and security personnel have resulted in casualties, injuries, and arrests, further intensifying public anger. Faced with mounting pressure, Pakistan announced reductions in electricity tariffs and subsidies on wheat flour. Yet many protesters viewed these measures as temporary concessions rather than solutions to deeper structural problems. The protests have exposed a gap between Islamabad’s official narrative and the lived experiences of many residents.
A TALE OF TWO KASHMIRS
The line dividing Pakistan-Occupied Jammu and Kashmir and the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir administered by India has become clearer in recent years. After the abrogation of Article 370 in August 2019, the Government of India initiated a large-scale programme of infrastructure development and administrative integration. Major highway projects, railway expansion, digital connectivity, healthcare facilities, educational institutions, tourism infrastructure and increased investment have transformed Jammu and Kashmir. New Delhi has pointed to record tourist numbers, better road connectivity, the Chenab Rail Bridge, new tunnels and better welfare schemes as proof of the region’s growing connectivity with the rest of India. Overwhelming evidence of increased public investment, infrastructure development, while political rhetoric over Article 370.
In contrast, Pakistan-Occupied Jammu and Kashmir continues to witness recurring protests centred on inflation, unemployment, electricity prices, taxation, and limited political autonomy. This divergence has strengthened India’s argument that constitutional integration, democratic institutions, and sustained public investment offer a more stable path for development than prolonged political uncertainty.
The protests in Pakistan-Occupied Jammu and Kashmir represent one of the most significant challenges to Islamabad’s governance in the region in decades. They demonstrate that public dissatisfaction extends beyond isolated economic grievances and increasingly reflects broader concerns regarding accountability, representation, and development. For India, these developments reinforce its long-standing position that Pakistan has failed to provide effective governance in the territory under its control since the tribal invasion of 1947. While Pakistan continues to describe the region as “Azad,” the growing voices from its streets suggest that many residents remain dissatisfied with the promises made in its name. Whether the current movement evolves into a larger political challenge remains uncertain. However, one reality has become increasingly difficult to ignore: a territory once presented as a symbol of liberation is today witnessing widespread protests for basic necessities, democratic accountability, and economic justice. History has shown that governments derive legitimacy not merely from political claims but from their ability to serve their people. The unfolding events in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir suggest that this legitimacy is now being questioned by many of the very people Islamabad claims to represent.
(Dr. Tsultim Zangmo is a faculty member at the Centre for Chinese Studies and Language, University of Ladakh. Dr. Vikash Ranjan Singh is a faculty member at Zakir Husain Delhi College (Evening), University of Delhi.)
